Catholic University Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 4 Summer 1980

Article 6

1980

Connell, Five Years after: Labor's Antitrust
Exemption and the Scope of the Construction
Industry Proviso to Section 8(e)
Robert W. Smith

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Robert W. Smith, Connell, Five Years after: Labor's Antitrust Exemption and the Scope of the Construction Industry Proviso to Section 8(e),
29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 799 (1980).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/6

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Catholic
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

COMMENTS
CONNELL, FIVE YEARS AFTER: LABOR'S

ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND THE
SCOPE OF THE CONSTRUCTION
INDUSTRY PROVISO TO
SECTION 8(e)
The scope of organized labor's liability under the antitrust laws is a perplexing problem that continues to plague the courts.' Its solution demands
a reconciliation of often antithetical federal policies.2 The goal of antitrust
law is to protect society from the evils of monopoly power by promoting
competition; collective labor activity, however, is inherently anticompetitive.3 Consequently, the courts must delicately balance an antitrust policy
promoting competition with a labor policy permitting unions to eliminate
competition over wages, hours, and working conditions through collective
bargaining.
Organized labor is protected from antitrust liability through limited exemptions. The Clayton Act's statutory exemption applies to unilateral labor activity.4 Activity between labor and non-labor groups is governed by
I. As early as 1894, a federal court held that the antitrust laws conferred jurisdiction to
enjoin a strike by the American Railway Union. United States v. Debs, 64 F. 724 (C.C.N.D.
Ill., 1894). The Supreme Court overturned this determination, but it upheld criminal convictions against union officials for violating an injunction and refused to rule on the general
applicability of the antitrust law to labor unions. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
2. See general, St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 62
VA. L. REV. 603, 630 (1976).
3. See F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
183 (1977). To achieve the goal of eliminating competition in the labor market, unions must
monopolize the supply of labor. Successful unions, therefore, have the potential for imposing restraints affecting the cost of labor and ultimately the cost of production. Id See also
Cox, LaborandAntitrust Laws -a PreliminaryAnalysis,104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 254 (1955).
4. Ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976)). Section 6
states that "[niothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor organizations." Further, in § 20, the courts are prohibited from
enjoining a dispute "between an employer and employees.., growing out of the terms and
conditions of employment." Ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 738 (1914) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §
52 (1976)). Samuel Gompers called these sections the "Magna Carta" of labor. See Kutler,
Labor, the Clayton Act and the Supreme Court, 3 LAB. HIST. 19, 21 (1962).
The Clayton Act prohibited the literal application of antitrust law to mere combinations
of union members. Such combinations were not restraints on trade; however, it did not
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a judicially created body of law known as labor's nonstatutory exemption. 5
The boundaries of this second exemption have always been unclear. A
recent example of the difficult application of the nonstatutory exemption is
the Supreme Court's decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100.6 The Court found an antitrust violation when a union success-

fully picketed a nonunion general contractor to agree to restrict all
subcontracting work on a construction site to union employers.7
Connell sparked substantial speculation that the Court had narrowed
labor's antitrust exemption. 8 Moreover, the decision may have significantly curtailed the construction industry's protections under section 8(e)
of the National Labor Relations Act.9 In the five years since Connell, the
courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have not fully
agreed on its proper interpretation, but its antitrust ramifications have
been considerably less than expected. This comment will survey the decisions rendered in the wake of Connell that concern the scope of labor's
exempt all peaceful concerted activities and collective bargaining. See United States v.
Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
5. The labels "statutory" and "nonstatutory" are products of the federal courts. See,
e.g., Meatcutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (nonstatutory exemption); United States
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941) (statutory exemption). The nonstatutory exemption recognizes that a proper accommodation between the policy favoring collective bargaining and
the policy favoring free market competition requires the exclusion of some union-employer
agreements from antitrust sanctions that are not expressly exempt in the statute.
6. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
7. Id at 635.
8. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 1, at 630; Comment, Recent Developments in Labor
Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 436-59 (1976); Comment, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, 89
HARV. L. REV. 234-45 (1975); Note, Labor Union Subject to Antitrust Liability as well as
Unfair Labor PracticeRemedies, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 271-88.
9. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). Section 8(e) is an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act that makes it an unfair labor practice for a union and employer
to stop handling, using, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in products of any other
employer or to stop doing business with any other person. The construction industry, however, is exempted from this section by a proviso "relating to the contracting or the subcontracting of work to be done" on a construction site. Id
The original National Labor Relations Act or Wagner Act was passed in 1935 and it
remains the basic federal labor statute. See Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 141-67, 171-90 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. In order to lessen the
power of the unions, the Wagner Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations
Act, commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act, Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 & 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as LMRA]. The construction industry's proviso was added by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, popularly
known as the Landrum-Griffin Act. Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 & 29 U.S.C. [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
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antitrust exemption and the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of
the NLRA.
I.

LABOR-ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO CONNELL

Antitrust law has often been used to regulate union activity, especially
secondary boycotts. The scope of antitrust coverage, however, has varied
tremendously over the years. Congress and the Supreme Court have never
agreed at any given point in time on either the extent of labor's exemption
from antitrust law or the extent of permissible secondary activity under
labor laws. An analysis of these issues should, therefore, begin with an
historical presentation.
A. TraditionalAntitrust and OrganizedLabor
The antitrust era began with the passage of the Sherman Act' ° in 1890.
Although the Act was probably intended to regulate only monopolistic
business practices and commercial restraints on trade,'' it was soon ap-

plied to labor activity in the famous DanburyHatters case. 2 The Supreme
Court held a secondary boycott by the Hatters Union violative of the
Act.' 3 In response, Congress passed the Clayton Act's labor exemption to
the Sherman Act for peaceful concerted union activity.'" The Supreme
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
11. See E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT 3-54 (1930); A. MASON, ORGANIZED LABOR 120-31 (1925); Emery, Labor Organizationsandthe Sherman Law, 20 J. POL.
ECON. 599 (1912).

12. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). In 1895, the Supreme Court had declined to
pass on the applicability of the antitrust law to labor. See note I supra. In DanburyHatters,
however, the Court held that the Sherman Act prohibited a nationwide boycott against
products of a non-union hat manufacturer. 208 U.S. at 308-09. The United Hatters of
North America, seeking to organize a Connecticut manufacturer, struck a factory and urged
the public to boycott the manufacturer and all other persons who sold its hats. The Court
found the boycott of "all other persons" to be a secondary boycott forbidden by the Sherman Act's ban on obstructing the free flow of commerce. Id at 306.
13. Id at 293. Primary concerted activity is pressure on the company, one's direct employer, to refrain from doing something. Secondary activity is the application of economic
pressure against an employer with whom the union has no direct dispute to induce that
employer to cease doing business with another employer with whom the union does have a
dispute. See generallyR. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION, AND BARGAINING 240-73 (1st ed. 1976); St. Antoine, National Labor Policy. Reflections and Distor-

tions of Social Justice, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 535, 542-45 (1979).
14. The Act provides that:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor.

. .

organizations,. . . or to forbid or restrain individual members of

such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations . . . be held to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
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Court followed with a narrow interpretation of the "exemption" and continued to apply antitrust laws to union activity.
In Duplex Printingv. Deering, 5 New York machinists participated in a
secondary boycott to support an attempt in Michigan to unionize a printing press manufacturer. The Court found this action to be an illegal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.' 6 The majority explained that
sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act protected only union activities between an employer and his employees, and did not encompass an attempt
to organize a new employer. 7 An influential dissenting opinion by Justice Brandeis reproached the Court for overriding congressional intent to
remove the federal courts from the adjudication of antitrust claims arising
from peaceful labor activities.' 8
Partially in response to the trend represented by Duplex Printing,'9 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act's 20 prohibition against the issuance of injunctions in most labor disputes.2 ' Congress impliedly overruled
Duplex Printing by defining a labor dispute as "any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment . . . regardless of whether or not
22
the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.,
Thus, Norris-LaGuardia represented an indirect reaffirmation of the ClayClayton Act, § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
15. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). Duplex Printing involved a boycott by machinists working for
newspaper publishers in New York in support of an attempt by machinists in Michigan to
unionize a printing press manufacturer. The Michigan manufacturer was the only major
national printing-press manufacturer remaining unorganized. Through the boycott, the unions were attempting to protect gains already made in the industry. Id at 462-63.
16. Id at 466. See note 13 supra.
17. Id at 478.
18. Id at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
19. The Court relied on Duplex Printingto find antitrust violations in subsequent cases
involving refusals by union members to handle goods or work on goods furnished by another employer which the union was seeking to organize. See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Stone Cutters, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (striking down a union rule which forbade members to
work on non-union sites); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922)
(a strike was violative of the antitrust laws because the union intended to restrain entry of
non-union products into the market).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976) (peaceful strikes, picketing, and boycotts sheltered
against injunctions issued in federal courts at the employer's request).
21. As the Supreme Court has stated: "The underlying aim of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was to restore the broad purpose which Congress thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but which was frustrated, so Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction." United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1941). The Senate Judiciary
Committee Report explained that the Act's purpose was "to protect the rights of labor in the
same manner the Congress intended when it enacted the Clayton Act, which Act, by reason
of its construction and application by the Federal Court, is ineffectual to accomplish the
Congressional intent." S.REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1932).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1976).
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ton Act's purpose of exempting peaceful labor activity regardless of its primary or secondary nature.
After Norris-LaGuardia, the Court's attitude toward labor's antitrust exemption changed dramatically. For example, in Apex Hosiery v. Leader,2 3
the Court found that the Sherman Act was aimed only at commercial market restrictions on competition and not at labor activities designed to eliminate competition based on wages.24 In Apex Hosiery, a company's
resistance to a closed shop2 5 proposal resulted in the forceable seizure of a
plant by employees and a sit-down strike. The Court found no violation of
the Sherman Act in this primary labor activity. Moreover, the Court acknowledged in dicta that labor unions inevitably restrain competition
among employees over the price of their services, but such actions are not
the kind of market restraint prohibited by the antitrust laws.2 6
In the term after Apex Hosiery the Court formally recognized labor's
antitrust exemption. In United States v. Hutcheson,27 the Court held that
sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, along with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, should be read in tandem to determine whether union activity has
violated the antitrust laws. 2' This interpretation created a genuine immunity for peaceful union activities that included secondary boycotts in support of union organizing drives. In short, the Court protected a union
from liability under the antitrust laws so long as it acted in its own "self23. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
24. Chief Justice Stone explained that:

strikes or agreements not to work, entered into by laborers to compel employers to
yield to their demands, may restrict to some extent the power of employers who are
parties to the dispute to compete in the market with those not subject to such demands .... [T~he mere fact of such restrictions on competition does not in itself
bring the parties to the agreement within the condemnation of the Sherman
Act. .

.

. Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate

the competition from non-union made goods, an elimination of price competition
based on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organization. But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of

curtailment of price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Id at 503-04 (citations ommitted).
25. The closed shop is a union security arrangement in which the employer agrees to
hire only members in good standing of the union. See R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 64042. These arrangements were later outlawed by § 8(a)(3) of Taft-Hartley. 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3) (1976).
26. 310 U.S. at 501.
27. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).

28. Id at 226. Instead of relying on the Apex decision to determine whether the strike
and boycott were illegal restraints upon the product market, the Hutcheson Court looked to
the labor union exemption for peaceful concerted activities under the Clayton Act and § 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court found that Congress intended to override the narrow

judicial reading of the Clayton Act with the passage of Norris-LaGuardia.
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interest and [did] not combine with non-labor groups. ",29
Hutcheson decreased the importance of the Sherman Act in regulating
activities of organized labor. Nevertheless, the Court has subsequently
made clear that labor organizations lose their immunity when they combine with non-labor groups to restrain trade. For example, in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW,3 ° the union joined in an agreement with various
New York City employers and manufacturers that prohibited businesses
outside the city from selling their products in New York unless they had
an agreement with the union. This arrangement was designed to maintain
jobs and high wages for the union, but it also created a sheltered market.
The Supreme Court held that the union had forfeited its antitrust immunity because it aided a non-labor group in the creation of a business monopoly.3'
Allen Bradley has become the paradigm case on the limits of labor's
immunity from the antitrust laws. It established a "collusion exception" to
the broad immunity rule of Hutcheson.32 A violation of the Sherman Act
will be found when a boycott directly restrains competition in the business
market and is brought about by a combination of union and employers. In
such circumstances, Apex Hosiery does not apply because the union is not
acting alone.
The Hutcheson-Bradley doctrine remained unchallenged until the
Supreme Court decided the companion cases of United Mine Workers v.
Penningon33 and Almalgamated Meatcuters v. Jewel Tea Co.34 in 1965.
In Pennington, the United Mine Workers and the major coal producers
conspired to drive smaller, less efficient operators out of business by establishing a uniform industry-wide wage rate higher than the smaller producers could afford. The union could not rely on Hutcheson because it had
not acted alone. Nevertheless, since the limit on competition was based on
a uniform wage rate, the disputed activity involved only the labor market
29. Id at 232. Four years later, the Court held that a union could engage in a secondary boycott even if it had a destructive impact on the employer's business. Hunt v.
Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
30. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
31. Id at 810.
32. See E. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 185. Congress had reaffirmed
labor's exemption from the antitrust laws during enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947.
The original House version of the Act would have subjected unions to antitrust liability, but
those provisions were deleted by the Conference Committee. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510,
80th Cong., Ist Sess. 65 (1947), reprintedin [1947] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 1135.
Nevertheless, Taft-Hartley made unlawful certain secondary labor activities and allowed
private recovery of damages. 29 U.S.C §§ 160(0, 187 (1976).
33. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
34. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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empt from the antitrust laws, but there was no majority agreement on the
reason for that result. According to Justice White, the unions did not violate the antitrust laws, because the marketing hours restriction was so intimately related to wages, hours, and working conditions that bona-fide
arms-length bargaining for such a provision, not in combination with a
non-labor group, was exempt from the Sherman Act.39 On the other hand,
Justice Goldberg explained that under the rationale of Hutcheson, collective bargaining over any mandatory subject of bargaining,4 ° such as wages,
is always exempt from the antitrust laws. 4 1 Nevertheless, this view did not
create a different result since the Court held that the hours restriction was
permissible under both the labor laws and the antitrust laws.4 2
In contrast to Pennington, there was no conspiracy to eliminate business
competition alleged in Jewel Tea.43 Whether the Supreme Court established new limits on the labor exemption as formulated in Hutcheson is
clouded by two factors. First, the Court found the activity of the Meatcutters to be within the labor exemption. Second, Jewel Tea did not produce
a majority opinion. 44 Although a majority found the agreement covered
by the exemption, only three justices considered the failure to plead and
prove an anticompetitive conspiracy not to be fatal to an attack on a
union-employer agreement.4 5 Thus, the Court's divided opinion raised the
question of whether Jewel Tea went beyond Allen Bradley by declaring
that the labor exemption could be lost if the union obtained an agreement
with a single employer which had a direct restraint on competition and
was of no "immediate and legitimate concern to union members., 46 Thus,
the effect of Jewel Tea was to create new uncertainties about when unions
would be found liable under the antitrust laws. Hutcheson's clear and
broad immunity had become blurred. The Court had apparently revital39. 381 U.S. at 689-90.

40.

d at 697.

41. Id at 710.

42. Justice White found the restrictive market hour clause to be within the realm of
wages, hours, and other terms of employment, and, therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining. Id at 391. See Cohen, Labor and the Antitrust Laws.- A New Look at a Recurring
Issue, in SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 22D ANN. INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW, 157,
161-65 (1976).
43. 381 U.S. 676, 688 (1965).

44. Jewel Tea produced three separate opinions: the opinion of Justice White joined by
Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., id at 679-97; the opinion of Justice Goldberg joined by

Harlan, J., and Stewart, J., id at 697-735; and the opinion of Justice Douglas joined by
Black, J. and Clark, J.id at 735-738.
45. Id at 689-697.
46. Id at 692.

19801

Construction Industry Proviso

ized the practice of judicially determining the legitimacy of labor's activities and objectives under antitrust.
Connell made the status of the labor exemption more uncertain.47 Connell arose in the context of the construction industry and involved secondary activity under the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act.4 8 The labor aspect of Connell requires additional background in order to clarify its interconnection with the Court's
opinion on labor's antitrust immunity.
B. The Section 8(e) Construction Industry Proviso
Technical loopholes in the secondary boycott provisions of Taft-Hartley4 9 resulted in the passage of section 8(e) in the Landrum-Griffin Act in
1959.50 The Act proscribes collective bargaining agreements in which
union members employed by the contracting employers need not handle
non-union or struck goods of other employers. Until Landrum-Griffin,
such "hot cargo" clauses"' were a defense against what woukl otherwise
47. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Between Pennington/Jewel Tea and Connell the Supreme
Court decided one other labor exemption case. See American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968). In Carroll,the Court found that the labor exemption protected
unilateral union regulations which set the "price floor" an "orchestra leader" member could
charge for a "club date" engagement, because the regulations were limited to protecting the
union members' wages.
48. Section 8(e) states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered
into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent
unenforcible and void: Provided, that nothing in this subsection (e) shall apply to
an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction
industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site
of the construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure, or other
work: Provided further, that for the purposes of this subsection and section
8(b)(4)(B) the terms "any employer," "any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce," and "any person" when used in relation to the terms
"any other producer, processor, or manufacturer," "any other employer," or "any
other person" shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer,
contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or
manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the
apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, that nothing in this Act shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception.
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
49. LMRA § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976).
50. LMRA § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
51. See generally, F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 138-40; Note, Hot Cargo
Agreements Under NLRA." An Analysis of Section 8(e), 38 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 97 (1963).
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52
have been an illegal secondary boycott.

The Landrum-Griffin amendments made special allowances for the
uniqueness of construction industry.53 In the construction industry, unlike
manufacturing and service enterprises, employees work for many different
employers and for short periods of time. 54 Employees are not attached to
a particular employer but to the industry as a whole." A union member,
therefore, is interested in assuring that his union's collective bargaining
agreement is respected at each job site upon which a signatory employer
works whether or not the employer does the work himself or subcontracts
it out. Moreover, the union's interest extends beyond the terms and conditions of a particular project to future job opportunities and the continuity
52. In Local 1976, Carpenters Union v. Labor Board, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door),
the Court held that an employer's voluntary observance of an agreement with a union not to
handle non-union material was not unlawful under § 8(b)(4)(A). Section 8(e) was designed
to plug this gap in the legislation by making the "hot cargo" clause itself unlawful. National
Woodwork Mfg. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 634 (1967).
53. Landrum-Griffin also added section 8(f) which provides:
(f) It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor
organization of which building and construction employees are members (not established, maintained or assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act as
an unfair labor practice) because (I) the majority status of such labor organization
has not been established under the provisions of section 9 of this Act prior to the
making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following
the beginning of such employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or (4) such
agreement specifies minimum training or experience qualifications for employment
or provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular geographical area.
29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
Section 8(f) was given more extensive consideration by Congress since § 8(e) originated in
the Conference Committee, but both were enacted to accommodate the business and employment practices in the construction industry. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local
100, 421 U.S. 616, 632 (1975).
54. On the unique nature of employment in construction, see S. REP. No. 187, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1959); H. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1959) (legislative history of § 8(f)).
55. Prior to Taft-Hartley, the National Labor Relations Board refused to exercise jurisdiction over the construction industry because of its complexity. Precedents developed by
the Board before 1949 had evolved independent of considerations of the construction industry, and some of the difficulties in their subsequent application to construction were addressed in Landrum-Griffin. See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1959); H. REP.
No. 741, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1959). Seealso Daniel Constr. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 264, 267
(1961).

19801

Construction Industry Proviso

of any fringe benefits under a jointly administered benefit plan.5 6
The specific language of section 8(e) was also a partial response to the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction
Trades Council.57 In Denver Building Trades, a general contractor
awarded a subcontract for electrical work to a non-union company. In
response, the union struck the job site to force the subcontractor to employ
union help. The unions claimed that this action was part of a primary
dispute because the work of the subcontractors was interrelated with that
of the general contractor. The Supreme Court held, however, that the
union had engaged in an illegal secondary boycott because the objective
was to force the contractor to terminate the subcontract. 58
Congressional debate on whether to statutorily overrule this holding focused on the problems of picketing a non-union contractor on a multiemployer building project. While acknowledging the close relationship
between contractors and subcontractors at the job site,59 Congress chose
not to directly overrule Denver Building Trades; rather, it created the proviso to section 8(e). The proviso is limited to the allowance of subcontracting agreements for work done at the job site. A construction union,
therefore, may negotiate a union signatory clause 60 that requires the work
on a construction site to be subcontracted only to union contractors and to
be performed by a particular union's members. Such subcontracting
clauses were held lawful both before and after the passage of section 8(e)
in Landrum-Griffin.
56. See generally Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977).
57. 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See generally Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421
U.S. 616, 629-30 (1975).
58. 341 U.S. at 692.
59. See 105 CONG. REC. 17,881 (1959) (remarks by Sen. Morse); id at 15,541 (memorandum by Reps. Thompson and Udall); id. at 15,551-52 (memorandum by Sen. Elliott); id
at 15,852 (remarks by Rep. Goodell); id at 20,004-05 (remarks by Rep. Kearns).
60. A union signatory clause is a contract provision barring an employer from dealing
with a company that has not executed a labor contract. The signatory employer commits
himself to employ, or subcontract to employers who employ, only members of the signatory
union when employees are hired to work in the trade jurisdiction of the signatory union.
Prior to Connell such broad subcontracting clauses were not unlawful in the construction
industry. See Carpenters Union v. Labor Board, 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door). See also,
Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rockford Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 354 F.2d 1, 2-3 (7th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966) (clause valid that restricted subcontracting to
firms having collective bargaining agreement with the Building Trades Council or an affiliated union); Local 48 v. Hardy Corp., 332 F.2d 682, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1964) (clause valid that
restricted subcontracting to firms agreeing with all terms of master agreement, including
union security); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 536-37 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (clause valid that required a general contractor to subcontract only to subcontractors who had signed agreements with an affiliate of the union).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:799

On the face of the statute, the only limitation on construction industry
subcontracting clauses is their restriction to construction site work. Nevertheless, in Connell the Court also limited the construction industry proviso
to agreements secured within a collective bargaining relationship. Consequently, the proviso offered no shelter from a contractor's allegation of an
antitrust violation outside of the context of the collective bargaining relationship.
II.

THE CONNELL DECISION:

A

RADICAL DEPARTURE

FROM PRIOR LAW

After Pennington and Jewel Tea, it was hoped that the next Supreme
Court opinion would resolve the uncertain state of the law of the labor
exemption.6 1 The Connell opinion, however, only compounded its com62
plexity.
In Connell, Plumbers Local 100 secured a union signatory subcontracting clause 63 by picketing the Connell Construction Company, a general
contractor. Connell had never performed any bargaining unit work' and
the local had no intent or desire to represent any of Connell's employees.
The union sought only an agreement to use union contractors when subcontracting work fell within the local's jurisdiction. Connell signed such
an agreement under protest and sued the union for violating the Sherman
Act.
The agreement would ordinarily have violated section 8(e)'s ban on hot
cargo agreements, but the union argued that the agreement was covered by
the construction industry proviso. The district court 65 agreed, and it found
the agreement authorized and thus exempt from the antitrust laws.66 On
,appeal, the Fifth Circuit explained that the union was immunized from
61. See notes 34-46 and accompanying text supra.
62. See Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines.- An UnprecedentedSupreme
Court Term - 1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 1025 (1977); Comment, Connell: Broadening
Labor's Antitrust Liability While NarrowingIts ConstructionIndustry Proviso Protection, 27
CATH. U.L. REV. 305, 318 (1978).

63. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
64. As a general contractor, Connell did not hire employees to perform the work.
Rather it subcontracted the work to specific subcontractors. It never hired, nor had any
intention of hiring, plumbers as its employees. This practice is common in the construction
industry. See generally D. MILLS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANPOWER IN CONSTRUCTION 6-10 (1972).

65. Suit was filed in the 134th Judicial District Court of Texas by Connell Construction
Company. The Plumbers Local 100 was granted a motion to remove to the federal district
court.

66. 78 L.R.R.M. 3012 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (subcontracting agreement was exempt from
federal antitrust laws).
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antitrust liability because it did not conspire with a non-labor group and
acted pursuant to its own self-interest.6 7 The court affirmed the district
court's result without addressing the section 8(e) issue.6"
In a five to four opinion the Supreme Court reversed, finding the labor
exemption inapplicable.6 9 In its discussion, the Court reaffirmed labor's
basic statutory exemption under sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act and
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but because the alleged violation was not unilateral union activity, the Court found that the statutory exemption did not
protect Local 100.70 The union also found no protection from the nonstatutory exemption. The Court characterized labor's nonstatutory exemption
as a recognition by the courts of congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining and limited the scope of the exemption to the collective bargaining relationship." The Court's discussion of labor's nonstatutory exemption ignored the earlier distinction between cases involving an
anticompetitive conspiracy between a labor and a non-labor group and
those involving no such conspiracy. 2
Jewel Tea had been the only earlier case to consider whether the labor
exemption applied when a union-employer agreement was challenged
without a claim of conspiracy between the union and employer.73 As in
Jewel Tea, the complaint in Connell alleged no conspiracy between the
union and the unionized subcontractors. The majority opinion neglected
this crucial factor; rather, it focused on the magnitude of the union's restrictive agreement and its affect on the business market.74 As a result, the
Court found for the first time that a union-employer agreement, without a
67. 483 F.2d 1154, 1166 (5th Cir. 1973).

68. Id.
69. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). Five members of the court held that the agreement was not
exempt from federal antitrust laws. Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Stewart explained
that the labor laws are the exclusive remedy for a union's secondary violations. Id at 638.
Justice Douglas joined with the four dissenters, but he emphasized that the union's conduct
should have been regulated exclusively by federal labor laws, because the plaintiff contractor based its complaint on the ground that the union coerced it into signing the subcontracting agreement. Id at 638.
70. Id at 621. See notes 4-5, 14, 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
71. 421 U.S. at 622.

72. Id at 625 n.2.
73. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 688 (1965). See
notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
74. The Court split into three groups in Jewel Tea with Justices White, Goldberg, and
Douglas writing the opinion for their respective groups. Justice White's opinion was
adopted as that of the Court. Similarly, in Connell,Justice White provided the critical fifth
vote. See Gold, The "Logic" of the Connell Opinion, N.Y.U. 29TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR
25 (1976). But see Janofsky & Hay, Connell- Consistent with Past,Indicative of the Future,
N.Y.U. 29TH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 3 (1976).
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claim of union-employer conspiracy, could be the basis for a federal antitrust suit.

75

The Court explained that the agreement secured by Local 100 was
outside the collective bargaining relationship. Consequently, the agreement was the basis of an antitrust suit because it had potential for restraining competition in the business market in a manner that would not
follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages and
working conditions.7 6 In examining the restraint on the business market
resulting from the agreement, the Court found that the agreement excluded non-union subcontractors from a portion of the market. 7 The
Court stated that the non-union contractors were excluded "even if their
competitive advantages were not derived from substandard wages and
working conditions. '7 1 Since no evidence had been submitted in the lower
court to show tat the competition from non-union contractors was based
on efficiency or on any other factor other than lower wages, the case was
remanded.7 9
After Connell labor unions may lose their nonstatutory exemption by
participating in an Allen Bradley type conspiracy or by unilateral insistence on an agreement that directly restrains the business market and is
outside of a direct collective bargaining relationship. The decision's teaching does not appear to apply to agreements within the collective bargaining context. Connell was a non-union contractor and the union did not
seek an agreement covering Connell's own employees. Thus, the Court
did not address whether a restraint of the type found in Connell could be
entitled to antitrust exemption if included in an otherwise lawful collective
bargaining agreement."0 Nevertheless, the Court's emphasis on the lack of
a direct collective bargaining relationship indicates that the Court may
'have upheld the agreement if it had arisen from collective bargaining.
The final issue examined by the Connell Court was whether the agreement was nevertheless authorized by the labor laws, specifically the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). 8 ' Presumably, if the agreement
75. Apparently the Court dispensed with the requirement of conspiracy for subjecting

union activity to antitrust liability, at least outside the collective bargaining relationship.
See Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Federal Maritime Comm'n 543 F.2d 395, 404 (D.C. Cir.
1976). See also 61 CORNELL L. REV. 436, 448 n.63 (1976); 50 TUL. L. REV. 418, 426 (1976).
76. 421 U.S. at 635.
77. The majority noted that the restrictive agreements were designed to force non-union
subcontractors out of the market. 421 U.S. at 623.
78. Id
79. Id at 637.
80. See id at 625.
81. Id at 626.
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had fallen within the bounds of the construction proviso, it would have
been immune from the strictures of antitrust.8 2 The Court implied that a
clause within the protection of the labor laws is outside antitrust liability.83
Union signatory subcontracting clauses had been historically lawful and
prevalent in the construction industry. 84 Nevertheless, the majority found
that the subcontracting agreement was outside the scope of section 8(e)
since it was not obtained in the context of a direct collective bargaining
relationship with the employer. The Court so held despite clear legislative
history that such subcontracting clauses would remain lawful after the passage of section 8(e)." During legislative debate, Senator John F. Kennedy
told the Senate: "Agreements by which a contractor in the construction
industry promises not to subcontract work on a construction site to a nonunion contractor appear to be legal today. They will not be unlawful
under section 8(e)." 86 The only recognition of this statement in Connell
was buried in a footnote of the majority's opinion.87 Moreover, the legislative history does not support the position that the proviso is limited to
collective bargaining contracts. 88 Indeed, the Court itself noted that "on
82. Id See Suburban Tile Center, Inc. v. Rockford Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
354 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 960 (1966) ("It would be unreasonable to
hold that success in securing . . . an agreement [lawful under § 8(e) proviso] constitutes a
violation of the antitrust laws.").
83. The Court explained that if the agreement was explicitly permitted by the construction industry proviso to § 8(e), antitrust policy would defer to the NLRA. 421 U.S. at 62526.
84. See note 60 supra. See also Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839 (1965), a 'd on
other grounds, 405 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1968); Laborers, Local 1082, 150 N.L.R.B. 158 (1964),
affid on other grounds, 384 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1967); Northeastern Ind. Bldg. and Constr.
Trades Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), remanded on other grounds, 352 F.2d 696 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
85. The House Conference Report stated that the committee did "not intend that this
proviso should be construed to change the present state of the law with respect to the validity
of this specific type of agreement." H.R. REP. No. 1117, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1959). See
St. Antoine, supra note 2, at 623-24.
86. 105 CONG. REC. 17,900-01 (1959). Kennedy also stated:
Since the proviso does not relate to section 8(b)(4) strikes and picketing to enforce
the contracts excepted by the proviso will continue to be illegal under § 8(b)(4)
whenever the Sand Door case is applicable. It is not intended to change the law
with respect to judicial enforcement of these contracts, or with respect to the legality of a strike to obtain such a contract.
Id Prior to, and under Sand Door, agreements between unions and general contractors
restricting the subcontracting of work were not unlawful. See Carpenters Union v. Labor
Bd., 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door).
87. 421 U.S. at 629 n.8.
88. The legislative history shows an intent to preserve the pattern of collective bargaining as it existed at the time. 105 CONG. REc. 17,899 (1959) (remarks by Sen. Kennedy); id
at 18,134 (remarks by Rep. Thompson).
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its face the proviso suggests no such limitation."8 9
The Court could not believe, however, that Congress in its desire to limit
"top-down" organizing could have authorized the type of agreement secured by Local 100. 9 1 It considered subcontracting agreements with
"stranger contractors" to be an almost unlimited organization weapon. 9 2
In so finding, the Court was relying as much on its own notions of appropriate labor policy toward organizing tactics as it was on the legislative
history of the statute. In short, the Supreme Court read a new limitation
into the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). In the Court's view,
Congress intended only to allow subcontracting agreements within the
context of a collective bargaining relationship. 93
Having found the agreement to be outside section 8(e), the Court held
that the remedies under Taft-Hartley would not be exclusive,9 4 even

though in 1947, Congress had explicitly rejected a provision that would
have authorized treble damages for secondary boycott violations.9 5 As
Justice Powell explained: "In the legislative history of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments,. . . Congress rejected attempts to regulate secondary activities by repealing the antitrust exemptions in the Clayton and NorrisLaGuardia Acts, and created special remedies under the labor law instead." 96 Justice Stewart also noted that, "Congress in 1947 did not prohibit all secondary activity by labor unions, .. and those practices which
it did outlaw were to be remedied . . . by § 303. " 97 While both Justice
Powell and Justice Stewart agreed that antitrust sanctions would be impermissible under the clear legislative history of 1947, the two Justices parted
company over the interpretation of the subsequent legislative history of
section 8(e) in the 1959 amendments. Justice Powell, writing for the ma89. 421 U.S. at 628.

90. "Top-down" organizing campaigns are those in which unions use economic weapons to force recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of his employees. The
1959 Act was intented to limit such organizing tactics. 105 CONG. REC. 6428-29 (1959) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater); id at 6648-49 (remarks of Sen. McClellan). As seen by the
Connell Court, the only special consideration given unions in organizing was the allowance
in § 8(f) of "pre-hire" agreements in the construction industry. 421 U.S. at 632.
91. Id. The Court in Connell considered it "highly improbable" that the 1959 Congress

intended its § 8(e) proviso to be used for "top-down" organizing because it had limited such
organizing in § 8(b)(7). Id

92. Id at 631.
93. Id at 627.
94. Id at 634-35.
95. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-67 (1947); 93 CONG. REC.
4757, 4770, 4834-4874 (1947).

96. 421 U.S. at 634.
97. Id at 645-46 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252
(1964).
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jority, stated that "[t]here is no legislative history in the 1959 Congress
suggesting that labor-law remedies for § 8(e) violations were intended to
be exclusive, or that Congress thought allowing antitrust remedies in cases
like the present one would be inconsistent with the remedial scheme of the
NLRA. ' 9 8 Consequently, despite Justice Stewart's strong dissent, the majority found that activities not protected by section 8(e) may be subject to
antitrust liability.99
As mentioned earlier, the most crucial element of the Connell holding
was the lack of a collective bargaining relationship between the contractor
and the union. The Court, therefore, examined the union's organizing tactic and found that it could have directly restricted the business market. In
order to bolster its position, the Court also intimated that other features of
the agreement, such as a "most favored nation clause'"
cast an additional negative light on the union's actions."' Nevertheless, given the special aspects of Local 100's organizing tactics, Connell should not be read
generally as significantly narrowing both labor's antitrust exemption and
the construction proviso. The Court's opinion should at least be limited to
cases in which there is an absence of a collective bargaining relationship. 102
98. 421 U.S. at 634. There is some evidence, however, that Congress did not intend
antitrust remedies for § 8(e) violations. For example, representative Alger unsuccessfully
proposed an amendment in 1959 that would have repealed antitrust immunity for any acts
in concert by two or more labor organizations. See id at 635 n. 16; Gold, supra note 74, at
31-33.
99. Id at 637. While holding that the union's agreement was subject to federal antitrust
laws, the Court ruled that it did "not follow that the state antitrust law may apply as well."
Id at 635. All of the Justices agreed that the use of state antitrust law must be preempted
because state antitrust law may frustrate federal antitrust policy. Id at 637. The case was
settled out of court on remand.
100. A most favored nations clause requires the union to give an employer the benefit of
the most favorable terms the union subsequently accords any other employer. See generaly
Comment, Antitrust Law.- Most FavoredNation Clause andLabor'sAntitrust Exemption, 19 J.
PuB. L. 399 (1970). The NLRB has found the most favored nation clause to be a lawful
mandatory subject of bargaining. Dolly Madison Indus., Inc., 182 N.L.R.B. 1037 (1970).
101. See 421 U.S. at 623. Even though "most favored nations" clauses were not challenged in Connell, the Court's discussion in Connell may strengthen an antitrust attack
against them. See Janofsky & Hay, supra note 74, at 17. The Court's concluding discussion,
however, focuses solely on the anticompetitive impact of the union signatory clause outside
a collective bargaining relationship without a concomitant reference to the most favored
nations clause. Cf. Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546
(7th Cir. 1970) (a most favored nation clause does not violate the antitrust laws).
102. The unresolved nature of the issues in the wake of Connell was expressed by a
recent commentary: "In evaluating Connell's new consensus, the result reached by the majority can be viewed as another sui generis response to a particular problem in a specific
industry, rather than the exposition of a governing principle that might guide lower courts
and litigants in future cases." E. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 190.
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CLEARLY DELINEATED

THEORY

Two major streams of controversy flow from the Connell decision. The
first involves the scope of the construction industry proviso; the second
concerns the requirements for labor's antitrust exemption. Each retains
many of the unresolved issues under the Pennington/JewelTea doctrine." °3
Connel/s teaching has merely compounded the uncertainties. The lower
courts and the National Labor Relations Board have often faced these difficult issues during the five years since Connell. A survey of their decisions
can aid in understanding the limitations of the Supreme Court's teaching.
A. New Applications ofAn/itrust Law to Labor
The scope of labor's antitrust exemption involves a variety, of significant
considerations. For example, whether the exemption will protect union
activity from antitrust attack may depend on the presence of a labor law
violation. Moreover, when the exemption does not apply, a finding of unlawful secondary activity may constitute aper se violation of the Sherman
Act. Further, the judiciary must grapple with the applicability of Connell
to labor activity both within and without a collective bargaining relationship. Defining the current state of labor's antitrust exemption, therefore,
necessitates the piecing together of several court opinions each considering
some of these issues in novel circumstances.
In Mackey v. National Football League,"° for example, the court examined whether a non-labor group could assert and be entitled to a labor
exemption. A group of players challenged the NFL's "Rozelle Rule,"
which allowed the League Commissioner to require clubs acquiring a free
agent to compensate the free agent's former club. The district court held
that the rule was a per se violation of the Sherman Act as a concerted
refusal to deal and a group boycott by the league. 1 5 On appeal, the league
argued that it was entitled to a labor exemption from the antitrust laws.
The Eighth Circuit explained that non-labor parties may avail themselves
of the nonstatutory labor exemption when they are parties to a collective
bargaining agreement, but it held that the exemption could not be used by
the NFL since the agreement with the players was not a product of bona
103. See Levy, The Connell ConstructionCompany Case:Antitrust Liabilityfor Union Activity, 5 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 259 (1976); Comment, Labor's Antitrust Immunity After Connell, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 971 (1976); Comment, Connell Construction Company v. Plumbers
Local 100. New Limits on Labor's Antitrust Immunity? 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 536 (1976);
Note, Labor's Antitrust Exemption After Connell, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 852 (1975).
104. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
105. 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975).. See Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,

Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycotts are per se violations of § I of the Sherman Act).
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fide arm's length negotiations.' °6 In the absence of protection from the
exemption, the court held that the Rozelle Rule contradicted the rule of
reason and thus constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation
of the Sherman Act. Significantly, the Court did not apply aper se analysis.' ° 7 It implied that a rule of reason approach is appropriate in cases in
which a questionable clause is contained in an agreement between a union
and a multi-employer group. Regardless, the major issue faced by the
court, whether an employer group could claim a nonstatutory exemption
for the inclusion of a specific clause (Rozelle Rule) in a collective bargaining agreement, is a question that has remained unique to professional
sports.'
The Mackey decision was cited with approval by the Second Circuit in
Commerce Tankers Corporation v. National Maritime Union'09 to support
the appropriateness of applying the rule of reason when the nonstatutory
exemption is found inapplicable. In that case, the Commerce Tankers
Corporation attempted to sell its last vessel to Vantage Steamship Corporation. The National Maritime Union objected to the sale because Commerce had not obtained a commitment from Vantage to continue to use
the NMU as the bargaining representative of the seamen on the vessel. A
flurry of litigation followed among Commerce, Vantage, NMU and the
106. 543 F.2d at 612-16. The court also placed upon the union the legal duty to bargain
over the reserve system as a mandatory subject if management so desires. Any resulting
agreement, if arrived at through bona fide bargaining, would be exempt from antitrust attack by the athletes as members of the bargaining unit. Id. at 614. The court was unclear
about the effect of its decision if management continued to impose the reserve system after
the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. Id at 616 n. 18. See generally Garvey,
From Chattel to Employee The Athlete's Questfor Freedom and Dignity, 445 ANNALS 91,
98-101 (1979).
107. See id. at 619. Under the rule of reason, "the fact finder weighs all the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing
an unreasonable restraint on competition." Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 433
U.S. 36, 49 (1977). Per se rules of illegality do not require as much documentation and
apply only when conduct is "manifestly anticompetitive." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
108. An irony in the professional sports context is that the labor exemption has been used
to protect management's interests. The owners always insist on some form of the reserve
system to hold down player salaries. Moreover, until the recent rise of the sports unions, the
reserve system had been unilaterally imposed by management. Mackey established that this
"practice was violative of the antitrust laws, but it gave the unions the opportunity to shield
the reserve system through collective bargaining. Mackey may have also laid the sports
unions open to antitrust attack by college athletes who are not yet members of the bargaining unit. Regardless, the only legal recourse for a weak union, which has an agreement
forced upon it, may be an attack on the agreement as not the product of good faith and bona
fide collective bargaining. See note 106 and accompanying text supra. But see generally
McCourt v. NHL, 600 F.2d 1193, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 1979).
109. 553 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir. 1977).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:799

NLRB. The NLRB ruled that an agreement secured by the NMU blocking the sale of the vessel to Vantage violated section 8(e), because it committed Vantage to use NMU members and as such was an illegal union
signatory subcontracting agreement."10 Commerce and Vantage also
brought court actions for damages due to NMU's conduct under both the
NLRA and the Sherman Act. The district court, however, dismissed the
complaint on both counts. " '
An appeal to the Second Circuit followed. The court remanded for a
reevaluation of the applicability of the labor exemption and for possible
consideration of the merits of the antitrust claim. In guiding the lower
court's determination, the court quoted Professor Handler as follows:
This brings us to the question of antitrust liability when union
activity is held to be nonexempt. The principal danger of these
recent rulings is that a finding of antitrust liability will automatically be made whenever the challenged conduct is held to be
nonexempt. This would be a per se approach with a vengence.
Arrangements may fall outside the scope of mandatory bargaining and yet have no adverse effect on competition. We still must
find whether the agreement restrains trade and whether the restraint is unreasonable. A fair reading of Jewel Tea. . . satisfies
me that the Court intended that there be a full-scale rule of reason inquiry in every instance in which1t 2a nonexempt activity is
claimed to be in violation of antitrust.
Even though the Second Circuit did not have to apply the rule of reason to
the facts in Commerce Tankers, the court clearly indicated that it is the
proper approach.
In determining whether labor activity was privileged under the nonstatutory labor exemption, the court interpreted Connell as requiring that the
contested activity first be examined to determine whether it is exempt from
the antitrust laws. In the court's view, a violation of section 8(e) does not
necessarily eliminate the antitrust exemption, because the nonstatutory exemption, as stated in Connell, "has its source in the strong labor policy
favoring the association of employees to eliminate competition over wages
110. NLRB v. NMU, 486 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1973). This clause did not come within the
construction industry proviso so it was clearly distinguishable from Connell. See notes 48,
60 and accompanying text supra.
11. NMU v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 411 F. Supp. 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
112. 553 F.2d at 802; (quoting Handler, LaborandAntitrusi."A Bit ofHistory, 40 A.B.A.
ANTITRUST L.J. 233 (1971)). See also Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1238-39 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976). But see 553 F.2d at 805 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (record requires a finding that the union must be held responsible for violation of antitrust law.).
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and working conditions.""' 3 This policy applies whether or not a union
has engaged in conduct that is violative of federal labor law." 4 Thus, the
applicability of labor exemption is independent of compliance with the
National Labor Relations Act.
A somewhat different interpretation has been developed by the Third
Circuit. In ConsolidatedExpress, Inc. v. New York Shioping Assn.," 1 the
court examined collectively bargained containerization rules, that permitted union longshoremen to unload and reload all containers sent to the
Port of New York from locations within a fifty-mile radius. If a container
was shipped through the port without having been stripped or stuffed by
ILA members, the offending steamship carrier was required to pay a
$1,000 penalty for each offense. Inconsistent enforcement of the rules led
to the adoption of a supplemental agreement prohibiting any member of
the employer's group from supplying its containers to any other employer
who violated the rules. Subsequently, the freight consolidation business of
Consolidated Express (Conex) and Twin Express were effectively terminated when owners complied with the supplemental agreement and refused to supply them with containers needed for the ships.
Conex and Twin filed charges with the NLRB which found the
container rules violative of section 8(e)." 6 Conex and Twin followed with
a court action against ILA and member companies of the employer's
group seeking damages for violations of the Sherman Act and section
303(b) of the LMRA." 7 The district court rejected the plaintiff's request
8
for summary judgment on both counts."
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a trial on damages for the LMRA claim, but it affirmed the denial of summary judgment
on the antitrust claim and remanded for an examination of the availability
113. 421 U.S. at 622.
114. However, the Third Circuit has stated that "[t]o the extent Commerce Tankers may
suggest the possibility that a § 8(e) violation may be completely exempt under the Sherman
Act we find it unpersuasive." Consolidated Express v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d
494, 519 (3d Cir. 1979). See International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 402 (3d Cir. 1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353, 1354 (3d Cir. 1974)
(conduct illegal under federal labor law can claim no immunity from antitrust sanctions).
115. 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979).
116. The NRLB found this provision to be a hot cargo clause in violation of § 8(e).
Consolidated Express, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 956, 961 (1975). Due to a conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court may agree to review the legality of these types of negotiated work
rules. See International Long Shoremen's Ass'n, 102 L.R.R.M. 2361 (D.C. Cir. 1979) pettionfor cert.fled, 48 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1980) (No. 79-1082).
117. ILA v. NLRB, 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
118. Consolidated Express v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 452 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J.
1975).
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of the labor exemption." 9 The court recognized only a limited labor exemption defense to a claim for money damages under the Clayton. Act for
conduct which has been held to be illegal under federal labor law. It explained that a finding by the National Labor Relations Board that an
agreement violates section 8(e) precludes recognition of complete antitrust
immunity. 2 o Once the Board has found a violation, the congressional policy favoring labor activity has been forfeited. 12 1 Consequently, the Third
Circuit held that a secondary party can establish a prima facie case, under
section 4 of the Clayton Act, by showing that the collective bargaining
provision at issue was illegal under the labor law. The parties to the collective bargaining must then prove that: the illegality could not reasonably
have been foreseen when the contract was negotiated; the illegal contract
provisions and the steps taken to implement them were "intimately related" to the object of collective bargaining thought at the time to be legitimate; and the contract "went no farther than was reasonably necessary to
22
accomplish" that object.1
The Second and Third Circuits are plainly at odds. The Third Circuit
noted that "[t]o the extent that Commerce Tankers may suggest the possibility that a § 8(e) violation may be completely exempt under the Sherman
Act, we find it unpersuasive."' 123 It is the Second Circuit's opinion, however, that is more in tune with Connell. The Connell opinion considered
the exemption issue to be distinct from the secondary boycott question
under section 8(e). Similarly, the Second Circuit explicitly ruled that a
violation of labor law should not be equated with antitrust liability. Under
the Third Circuit's rationale, once the Connell Court found that the
union's actions violated section 8(e), it should have automatically found
the antitrust exemption to be lost.
The significance of the debate is heightened by a consideration of the
standard of review for labor activity under antitrust attack. If a labor law
violation automatically removes the labor exemption to antitrust sanctions,
the courts must then determine whether labor is subject to a per se or rule
of reason analysis. If the per se analysis applies, a union would be automatically vulnerable to antitrust attack under the Third Circuit's rationale
whenever it participates in secondary activity found to violate labor law.
119. Consolidated Express v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979).
120. Id at 518. But see, Commerce Tankers Corp. v. NMU, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977). See notes 109-14 and accompanying text, supra.

121. 602 F.2d at 512.
122. Id at 520. According to the court, this newly created defense is necessary to protect
the collective bargaining process. Id
123. Id at 519.
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In ConsolidatedExpress, the court found that without the labor exemption, the union's action constituted an illegal boycott which is usually aper
se violation of the antitrust laws.' z4 To apply the rule of reason, in the
court's view, was redundant because the jury would have to "reweigh
under a different label the question of the nonstatutory exemption." 125
Since the nonstatutory exemption had been lost, the court concluded that
laws without review of
the union's conduct was violative of the2 antitrust
6
activity.1
labor
the
of
the reasonableness
In his dissent, Judge Weis, disputed the majority's conclusion that a rule
of reason analysis "would be redundant."'' 2 7 He stated that:
if a boycott by a political, religious, racial, or consumer group is
to be subjected to rule of reason scrutiny, it is difficult to understand why that procedure should be denied a labor union simply
because some - but not necessarily all - of the pertinent factors
have been resolved in the labor exemption examination.' 28
The dissent further argues that "[a] union should not be singled out in a
manner that would deny it all the opportunities for defense afforded by the
non-competitor participants in similar boycotts."' 2 9 Thus, the analysis of
the majority in ConsolidatedExpress carries antitrust law too far. As the
dissent points out, boycotts by a noncompetitor are not alwaysper se violations.' 30 The court's holding is also inconsistent with Connell. Once the
124. Id at 522. Perse rules are rules of evidence. If an activity isperse illegal, the court
does not have to inquire into the actual effect on competition. See generally Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
125. 602 F.2d at 524.
126. Id The rule of reason, however, is the prevailing standard. Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). See also Note Boycott* 4 Specfic Definition
Limits the Applicability of a Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 818 (1977); note 107 supra.
127. 602 F.2d at 527. Judge Weis concurred with most of the majority's disposition but
dissented on the applicability of the per se rule.
128. Id. at 527-28.
129. Id As Judge Weis stated: "[a] political, religious or consumer group (non-competitive) that promotes a boycott of particular products to enforce its aim would not be guilty of
a per se violation." Id at 528. See generaly Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958).
130. 602 F.2d at 528. The hallmark of the classic group boycott is an effort by competitors to "barricade themselves from competition at their own level." L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 230, 245 (1977). The purpose of excluding competition has also characterized the
Supreme Court decisions involving the group boycott per se rule. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (per se rule applied when a distributor was
induced not to sell to a competing retailer); Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941) (per se rule applied when manufacturers induced retailers not to purchase from competing manufacturers). When confronted with circumstances that do not fit this classic boycott pattern, many courts have not applied the per se rule. See also Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76-79 (9th Cir. 1969). Seegenerally, Handler, Antitrust - 1978, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1363, 1364-74 (1978).
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Connell Court determined that the union's actions were not covered by the
nonstatutory labor exemption, it did not automatically apply a per se rule
but remanded to consider whether the agreement violated the Sherman
Act. 3' Determining whether the disputed activity is exempt from the antitrust laws should only be the first step in the inquiry.' 32
An additional factor in Connell was the lack of a collective bargaining
relationship between the union and the general contractor. Some circuits
have, therefore, held that the decision has no applicability when a collective bargaining relationship is present. For example, in CaliforniaDump
Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated General Contractors, 3 3 independent
owner-operators of dump trucks brought a class action against a labor
union and several trade associations, alleging that they had conspired in
violation of the antitrust laws. The Ninth Circuit explained, that "any
anti-competitive effect arose from a collective bargaining agreement between the union and trade association."' 134 The court distinguished Connell, finding it applicable only when the objectionable effect arises from a
separate noncollective bargaining agreement. The court concluded that
Connell does not govern antitrust status of collective bargaining agreements. 35 This position has been supported by at least two district
36

Courts. 1

The Connell opinion also left open the possibility that some labor activity outside a collective bargaining relationship may retain a limited antitrust exemption. The availability of such an exemption could be
131.

Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. at 637.

132. An antitrust case need not be tried and a violation found before a determination can
be made that a collective bargaining agreement is not within the labor exemption. Similarly,
a denial of the exemption does not mean there is an antitrust violation. FMC v. Pacific

Maritime Ass'n, 435 U.S. 40, 61 (1978).
133. 562 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1977).
134. Id at 613.
135. Id
136. See Bullard Contracting Corp. v. Local 91, 100 L.R.R.M. 2959 (W.D.N.Y. 1979);
Orange Belt Council v. Maloney, Inc., 98 L.R.R.M. 3193 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Swanson-Dean
Corp. v. Seattle Dist. Council of Carpenters, Nos. C76-707M, C77-298M (W.D. Wash. Oct.
7, 1977).
In Bullard,the court stated: "the presence of this collective bargaining relationship between the parties is the controlling distinction between this case and Connell. Since the
subcontracting and union security clauses were negotiated in the context of that relationship
they do not fall under the presumption of Connell and are exempt from the antitrust laws."
Id at 2962. If Connell does not govern union security arrangements made through a collective bargaining relationship, such restraints may be entitled to an antitrust exemption. In
such circumstances, the labor exemption should remain as it was under Pennington and
Jewel Tea. See California Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Association of Gen. Contractors,
562 F.2d 607, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1977).
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The Third Circuit concontingent on the magnitude of the restraint.
137
fronted this issue in Mfuko v. Trades Council.
Long John Silver's, a fast food chain, entered the Pittsburgh market with
the intention of building twelve franchised restaurants. The first two of
these were constructed by Muko, a non-union general contractor that directly employed only a handful of supervisory employees. As a result of a
publicity campaign by the local Building Trades Council, Long John Silver's agreed to conduct all subsequent construction projects on a union
basis. The site of the first Silver's restaurant had been picketed during
construction. When the restaurant opened, Council representatives
leafleted its patrons, advising them that Silver's used construction contractors who paid less than prevailing wages in the area. When Silver's approached the unions, a representative explained that there would be no
picketing or leafletting at the second Silver's location pending a decision
on the use of union contractors at future construction sites. Subsequently,
Silver's management representative decided to use only union contractors
certified by the Building and Construction Trades Council. 3 8
In response Muko filed an antitrust action. It alleged that Silver's decision to use only union contractors shut it out of a portion of the business
market in violation of the Sherman Act as interpreted in Connell. The
district court, however, in an unreported decision, entered a directed verdict in favor of the Building Trades Council and Silver's. It found that the
evidence submitted showed a unilateral decision by Silver's to accept bids
only from union contractors. On appeal, a divided panel held that the
agreement was not unlawful under the antitrust laws.' 3 9 The opinion by
the majority, however, was later withdrawn and the case was reargued
before the full Court of Appeals. 4°
The Third Circuit then voted eight to one to remand for a new trial. It
found that the anticompetitive effect of the agreement exposed Silver's and
137. 609 F.2d 1368 (3d. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
138. Id at 1371.
139. 99 L.R.R.M. 201 (3d Cir. 1978). Muko was originally heard before a divided three
judge panel. Under the first decision, labor unions have a nonstatutory exemption from the
antitrust laws which requires balancing labor's legitimate interest in improving wages with
society's interest in protecting competition. The panel found that the Building Trades Council retained its nonstatutory exemption because its efforts were narrow in scope and directed
at a single builder instead of an entire geographic area as in Connell. It read Connell as a
disapproval of union methods that go beyond protecting wages and working conditions and
held that the methods at issue were sufficiently limited to come under the nonstatutory exemption. Id
140. Judge Gibbson, who dissented in the first decision, wrote the majority opinion on
rehearing. 609 F.2d at 1370.
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the Trades Council to antitrust liability under Connell.14 ' In the court's
view, any agreement between the union and Silver's could not be found to
be within the nonstatutory labor exemption as a matter of law.' 4 2 As in
Connell, the Muko court did not find a violation of the antitrust laws; it
merely held that the union activity was not sheltered from antitrust attack
by the labor exemption. In reaching its conclusion, the majority turned to
Connell for guidance, because 143the union did not have a collective bargaining relationship with Silver's.
Connell recognized the possibility that agreements outside the collective
bargaining context might be exempt from antitrust liability, but held that
the exemption was unavailable in the facts as presented.'44 Regardless, the
majority in Muko found its facts indistinguishable from those in Connell.
Thus, the court held that an agreement outside of a collective bargaining
relationship is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny if it imposes direct restraint upon the business market not justified by Congressional labor policy. 145 The court also found that the directed verdict could not be affirmed
on the theory that the agreement was protected by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e), because there was neither a collective bargainSilver's nor any evidence of the Denver Building
ing relationship with
46
Trades problem. 1
Addressing this discussion of section 8(e), concurring Chief Judge Seitz
feared that district courts would be tempted in such cases to adopt a
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id at 1376.
Id at 1372.
Id
See notes 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
609 F.2d at 1375.
The circumstances in Denver Building Trades are sometimes referred to as "shoul-

der-to-shoulder" problems because union craftsmen and non-union workmen were working
next to each other at a job site. See note 57 and accompanying text supra.
The Muko court also rejected arguments by the defendants that the agreement was the

result of a unilateral management decision and that the plaintiff had made an insufficient
showing of economic injury. Muko could have avoided economic injury by going "doublebreasted" but the court found this alternative unacceptable because it would have required
Muko to unlawfully "coerce its employees into a collective bargaining relationship." 609
F.2d at 1391. A double-breasted contractor is an individual employer who acts as an em-

ployer for two separate corporations (a union breast and a non-union breast), one employing
union crews and the other non-union crews; in effect, Muko could merely have formed an-

other corporation using union employees for the Silver's job.
In response to the argument that the agreement between Silver's and the Council was the

result of a unilateral management decision, the court found that the company's action was a
capitulation to union demands and could not be considered voluntary even though the vice

president approached the Building Trades in the exercise of his company's own discretion.
Cf NLRB v. Servette, 377 U.S. 46 (1964) (NLRA is not violated when a union requests that
an employer exercise its discretion and refuse to do business with another employer).
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"shorthand method" of determining the nonstatutory labor exemption. 4 7
A trial court might first resolve whether an agreement constitutes an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA and then impose antitrust liability if the
conduct is not protected by the construction industry proviso to section
8(e). Judge Seitz also noted that the section 8(e) issue did not have to be
decided because the defendants had not raised it.' 48 Consequently, he
chided the court for giving an impression that a shorthand method was
appropriate. Such a method, he suggested, "would lead to needless resolution by the federal courts of significant labor law questions that ought to be
decided in the first instance by the NLRB."' 4 9
Judge Adams, also concurring, explained that but for Connell he would
have held the union activity as "not at all within the scope of the antitrust
statutes but . . . solely a matter for scrutiny under labor law."' 5 ° He believed that unions should be subject to antitrust liability only when they
are involved in an Allen Bradley-type combination which suppresses commercial competition or monopolizes the marketing of goods and services.'" Such an approach, he argued, "would not appear to conflict with
congressional intent inasmuch as Congress has on a number of occasions
enacted legislation in order to remove certain labor activity from the ambit
of the antitrust laws."' 52 Judge Adams intimated that Connell was
wrongly decided. In his view, a bare majority of the Supreme Court had
53
failed to appropriately accommodate labor laws to antitrust policy.'
147. Id at 1375 n.1 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
148. Id.
149. Id Cf Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 609 F.2d 494 (3d
Cir. 1979) (effect of prior NLRB determination that an agreement is violative of § 8(e)). See
notes 115-23 and accompanying text supra.
150. 609 F.2d at 1376 (Adams, J., concurring).
151. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
152. 609 F.2d at 1376. Judge Adams also stated:
Thus, for example, as the dissent notes, portions of the Clayton Act were enacted in
1914 for the purpose of inhibiting federal courts from using the Sherman Act in
order to curtail labor activity. In § 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17, unions
were declared not to be illegal combinations, and labor was pronounced not to be a
commodity or article of commerce. Also, § 20 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52, proscribed the issuance of injunctions against specifically enumerated practices of labor unions and removed any taint of illegality from those practices. And the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115, promulgated in 1932, further narrowed the circumstances under which the antitrust laws may be brought to bear
against labor unions.
Id at n.l (Adams, J., concurring).
153. One commentator has stated: "I thus adhere to my frequently expressed view that
antitrust is a singularly inappropriate weapon to curb labor union abuses and that such
abuses should be prohibited by specific labor legislation with specific and exclusive remedies." Handler, supra note 62, at 1025. See also P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
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Judge Aldisert, the sole dissenter in Muko, did not share what he called
the majority's "unabashed infatuation with the decision in Connell."'5 4
He argued for a different set of values less antagonistic to the rights of
organized labor and more in keeping with the congressionally established
national labor policy. While respecting its precedential value, Judge Aldisert did not find Connell to mandate the majority's decision. He explained that the proper test "must include a presumption that antitrust law
will not normally apply to union activity and that the union is not to be
saddled with the burden of proving its activity is exempt."' 55 He noted
that the lesson of history "is that the courts should stop presuming that
labor's activities come within the framework of antitrust laws."' 5 6 Congress has twice resorted to specific legislation to counteract federal court
decisions holding labor activity within the prohibitions of antitrust law.
Thus, the courts should only reluctantly interfere with labor activity to find
an antitrust violation.
Muko presented a union restraint that was different from the type ruled
upon in Connell. The union's objective in Muko was Silver's commitment
to hire union craftsmen.'5 7 In Connell, the objective was to prohibit subcontracting to any firm that did not have a contract with Local 100. The
degree of restraint was greater in Connell, because Local 100 did not simply prohibit subcontracting non-union. It also prohibited subcontracting
non-Local 100.158 Further, the picketing in Muko occurred at only one
site without causing a shutdown. In Connell, contractors who refused to
sign were picketed until Connell's construction site was shut down. Moreover, the handbilling in Muko lasted only one week.
The dissent also found first amendment and statutory protections for the
handbilling in Muko that were not present for the picketing in Connell.
'Even though section 8(b)(4) prohibits most secondary activity, its publicity
proviso endorses the right to truthfully advise the public. 59
' As the dissent
218-22 (1978); Christensen, The Supreme Court's Labor Law Decisions, October 1974 Term
- Past, Prologue and the Potomac Parallax, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, 32D
ANN. INSTITUTE ON LABOR LAW, 33 (1976); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 244-45 (1975); St. Antoine, Connell Antitrust Law at the Expense ofLabor

Law, 62 VA. L. REV. 603, 620-28 (1976).
154. 609 F.2d at 1377 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
155. Id at 1381-82.
156. Id at 1379.
157. See notes 148-49 and accompanying text supra.
158. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 631 (1975).
159. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(1970). The publicity proviso reads as follows:
Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing for the purpose of truthfully advising the public including consumers and

19801

Construction Industry Proviso

noted, the handbilling in Muko was a form of publicity to inform the public of the labor dispute between the unions and Muko. Moreover, there
was no evidence that the unions distributed handbills at any other establishment constructed by Muko, or at the premises of another company.
Thus, Long John Silver's agreement was partially the result of legitimate
handbilling. 6 o
Judge Aldisert, therefore, found that the Building Trades Council retained its nonstatutory exemption. Its efforts were "low-key and narrow in
scope" and were directed at a single builder rather than an entire geographic area as in Connell.16 1 Moreover, the Council had not insisted on a
union signatory agreement or most favored nations clause as in Connell.
Noting that there is "no easy test to determine where the axe must fall" on
antitrust liability for unions, Judge Aldisert was convinced that the methods employed by the Council distinguished Connell.' 6 2 He did not find the
lack of a collective bargaining relationship to be determinative.
Judge Aldisert saw Connell as only one "thread" in the "fabric of the
law. ' 63 He criticized the majority's interpretation of Connell "as a piece
from the
of judicial legislation which virtually destroys labor's exemption
164
antitrust laws outside a collective bargaining relationship."'
In light of these comments, Muko should be read narrowly. The court
did not find that an agreement made outside the collective bargaining context is automatically removed from nonstatutory antitrust exemption if it
violates section 8(e). The nonstatutory exemption should be weighed independently from compliance with labor law. The majority's decision
should not be interpreted as a determination that activity which is not protected by labor law is automatically liable under antitrust law. As was
members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an
employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of
inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer
in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any
goods, or not to perform any services at the establishment of the employer engaged
in such distribution.
Id Union handbilling has been held to be protected under § 8(b)(l).. See, e.g., Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
160. It is unlikely, however, that the members would have had any first amendment
claim had their handbilling been stopped by Silver's. As the Supreme Court recently explained, their rights are "dependent exclusively upon the National Labor Relations Act."
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976).
161. 609 F.2d at 1385.
162. Id.
163. Id at 1386.
164. Id.
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mentioned earlier, such a shorthand method was specifically excluded by
Judge Seitz who reminded the court that labor's antitrust exemption must
be analyzed solely in relation to Supreme Court precedent and not based
on any finding of a violation of section 8(e). As the majority itself stated:
"The fact that in Connell Justice Powell considered the actual and potential anticompetitive effects of the agreement independently of the § 8(e)
issue suggests that the presence of a § 8(e) violation may not itself decide
165
the exemption issue."'
Judge Seitz also reminded the court that the question of labor law violation is to be considered, in the first instance, by the NLRB. His reminder
is appropriate in light of the second stream of post-Connell controversy
about the scope of the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). Since
the NLRB is authorized by Congress to frame national labor policy, the
courts should give considerable weight to its interpretation of Connell concerning the breadth of section 8(e).
B.

Connell and the Scope of the Construction Industry Proviso to Section
8(e)

After Connell, it was difficult to predict the decision's impact on traditional subcontracting clauses. Local 100's subcontracting arrangements
were a relatively rare organizing tactic because they were obtained outside
a collective bargaining agreement, and it appeared that unions could continue to negotiate some secondary agreements.
Connell's interpretation of the construction industry proviso to section
8(e) had departed from those previously given by the NLRB and the
courts. Guidelines for handling section 8(e) proviso cases were issued by
the NLRB's General Counsel based on the assumption that Connell "significantly narrowed the scope of the proviso."' 6 6 The General Counsel
read Connell as restricting any subcontracting clauses unrelated to the
"shoulder-to-shoulder" problem of job site friction.' 6 7 He, therefore, required that a section 8(e) proviso agreement must be obtained in the con165. Id at 1375.
166. NLRB General Counsel Memorandum 76-57 (December 15, 1976), reprintedin
LAB. REL. YEARBOOK

300 (1976), [hereinafter cited as G.C. Mem. 76-57].

167. Id at 312. The General Counsel determined that the § 8(e) proviso permits only

"generic union" subcontracting clauses, and it does not protect "particular union" subcontracting clauses. Id

at 299. In the construction industry, however, an agreement not to

subcontract work to "a nonunion contractor" has traditionally meant that the employer can
subcontract only to employers with signed agreements with particular unions. See Local
1976, Carpenters (Sand Door & Plywood Co.), 113 N.L.R.B. 1210, 1229 (1955) ("nonunion"
meant not produced and manufactured by members of the United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America).
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text of a valid collective bargaining relationship and must be confined to
those times and job sites at which the signatory has employees represented
by the labor organization. Moreover, any such clause would be unlawful
if it required the subcontractor to be signatory with a particular union.'6 8
The Board finally ruled on this issue about a year and a half ago. After
an unprecedented six hours of oral argument about the scope of the section
8(e) proviso after Connell,'6 9 it issued four opinions simultaneously on November 13, 1978.7' A unanimous Board found that a "narrow interpretation" of the proviso as advocated by the General Counsel was not required
by Connell. 7 ' The Board stated:
The bottom line of the Court's opinion as we construe it is that
the construction industry proviso to § 8(e) permits subcontracting
clauses as those here in the context of a collective bargaining relationship and possibly even without such a relationship if the
clauses
are aimed at avoiding the Denver Building Trades prob72
lem.'
This interpretation affirmed the Board's prior position that the proviso
protects any agreement between "qualified parties which limits subcontracting of work to be performed at the site of construction to employers
who are signatory to a specific union agreement or to an agreement gener' 173
ally with the 'appropriate union."
168. The memorandum stated:
Where an employer and a labor organization are parties to a valid collective bargaining relationship, whether Section 9(a) or 8(f) of the Act, they may agree to a
Section 8(e) clause, otherwise protected by the 8(e) proviso, if
1.The clause is operational only at times when the employer has employees
represented by the labor organization.

2. The clause applies only to sites at which the employer has employees represented by the labor organization.
3. In the case of a Section 8(f) relationship, if such relationship is not the consequence of Section 8(b)(7) picketing.
G. C Mem. 76-57, supra note 166, at 20.
169. DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) Feb. 28, 1978, at A-9.
170. Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing), 239 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 99
L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978); Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Utilities Services Eng'r),
239 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 99 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1978); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
(Shriver-Topaz), 239 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978); Operating Eng'rs. Local
701 (Associated Builders), 239 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 99 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978).
171. See, e.g., Carpenters Local 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing), 239 N.L.R.B. No. 40,
99 L.R.R.M. 1580, 1585 (1978).
172. Id For a brief discussion of the Denver Building Trades problem, see note 57 and
accompanying text supra.
173. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1586. See also Construction Prod. & Maintenance Laborers' Union, Local 383 (Colson & Stevens Constr. Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1650
(1962), enfd inpart, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963).
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In the lead case, CarpentersLocal 944 (Woelke & Romero Framing), 74
Woelke & Romero was engaged to perform framing work pursuant to subcontracts entered into with a general contractor and a developer. The general contractor had been a party to a collective bargaining agreement with
the Carpenters that was due to expire. During negotiation of a successor
agreement, the parties reached an impasse over the unions' demands for
several clauses regulating the subcontracting of work to be performed at
the construction site. As a result, the unions picketed the company's construction sites, and employees of various subcontractors refused to work.
On these facts, the Board found no violation of section 8(e). It considered the union's subcontracting proposal to be a "classic" union signatory
clause which is secondary in nature because it is not concerned "primarily
with the labor relations of the contracting employer."'' I7 Such clauses are
proscribed by section 8(e) unless exempted by the construction industry
proviso. To determine whether the unions' subcontracting proposals were
privileged by the proviso, the Board analyzed its historical treatment of the
proviso in light of the principles in Connell. It concluded that the proviso
extends to all agreements made in the context of a collective bargaining
relationship. It also found protection for agreements outside such a relationship if they are addressed to common situs problems, such as the reduction of friction between union and nonunion employees at a job site.
Since the Carpenter's proposals had been advanced in the context of a
collective bargaining relationship, the Board concluded that they were
privileged by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) of the Act.
The Board considered agreements outside the collective bargaining relationship in Colorado Building and Construction Trades (Utilities Services
Engineering).176 Utilities Services had no collective bargaining relationship with the Building Trades Council; its employees were not represented
by any labor organization, nor did it normally require the services of subcontractors. Nevertheless, the Council secured a union standards subcontracting clause for "work which is not customarily performed by
employees of the contractor."'' 77 The Board found the clause to be secondary because it did not cover the contractor's employees. Moreover, it
174. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978).
175. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1585. The union had contended that the proposed subcontracting
provisions were lawful primary clauses designed to preserve traditional bargaining unit
work. Id at 1583. Cf, National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).

176. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 41, 99 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1978).
177. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1602. A union standards clause commits the employer to paying the
going union wage rate for any work that he subcontracts out. See generally Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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found that the clause was not protected by the proviso because the parties
had no collective bargaining relationship and the agreement was not
aimed at a common situs problem.
In Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council (Shriver-Topaz), on the other hand, the issue was the sufficiency of the relationship
between the employer and the union.'7 8 The Board rejected the notion
that proviso protection extends only to a relationship by which the union
represents a majority of the employees.' 7 9 It held that a section 8(f) relationship 8 ° was sufficient to protect the subcontracting clauses under the
construction industry proviso.""
Section 8(f) is another provision in which Congress recognized the special needs of the construction industry. It addresses the problem of conducting representation elections in an industry characterized by short-term
work at temporary job sites.' 82 In order to facilitate the collective bargaining process, section 8(f) permits an agreement between a construction
union and employer without any showing of the union's majority status.
In Shriver-Topaz, the Board found that such pre-hire agreements are protected by the construction industry proviso to the section 8(e) collective
bargaining relationship. The importance of this holding'can be shown
through an examination of the two separate fact patterns the Board considered in that case.
178. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978).
179. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1599.

180. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976). See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
181. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1599.
182. As stated in the report of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee:
In the building and construction industry it is customary for employers to enter
into collective bargaining agreements for periods of time running into the future,
perhaps 1 year or in many instances as much as 3 years. Since the vast majority of
building projects are of relatively short duration, such labor agreements necessarily
apply to jobs which have not been started and may not even be contemplated. The
practice of signing such agreements for future employment is not entirely consistent with Wagner Act rulings of the NLRB that exclusive bargaining contracts can
lawfully be concluded only if the union makes its agreement after a representative

number of employees have been hired. One reason for this practice is that it is
necessary for the employer to know his labor costs before making the estimate
upon which his bid will be based. A second reason is that the employer must be
able to have available a supply of skilled craftsmen ready for quick referral. A
substantial majority of the skilled employees in this industry constitute a pool of
such help centered about their appropriate craft union. If the employer relies upon
this pool of skilled craftsmen, members of the union, there is no doubt under these
circumstances that the union will in fact represent a majority of the employees
eventually hired.
S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprintedin [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2344-45. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
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Shriver signed a master agreement with a Building Trades Council that
contained provisions restricting subcontracting by the contractor and economic action by the labor parties. In May 1975, a business representative
of Carpenters Local 1499 approached Shriver's superintendent at a
townhouse
project and asked "whether the carpenters on the job were
'union."" 8 3 When he was informed they were not, he insisted that Shriver
was obligated by the terms of the master labor agreement to the Local 1497
agreement and stated that the union would picket for the purpose of having that agreement signed. The local's position was supported by the
Council which sent a telegram to Shriver stating that it had been "authorized to sue you for an injunction and damages."' 84 The Council did not
file a lawsuit to enforce the agreement and no picketing occurred. Nevertheless, Shriver filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Council
and Local 1497. The NLRB held that Shriver and the union had "an
ongoing collective bargaining relationship" because Shriver had not repudiated the agreement which by its terms automatically renewed itself annually. Consequently, the subcontracting clauses were within the scope of
185
the section 8(e) construction industry proviso.
The second fact pattern concerned Topaz who was a framing subcontractor at a townhouse project. All workers on the project were union except for Topaz's employees. Topaz had never been a party to any labor
agreements with any unions. A business agent of Local 1752 asked why
"Topaz was not signed up with the Union and said that the union would
have to picket if Topaz did not sign."' 18 6 A representative of Topaz indicated that the company was willing to sign a contract for the Claremont
job site only if the union would accept certain conditions. The union rejected Topaz's proposal and picketed the job site for ten days.
The Board again found the master agreement sanctioned by section 8(e)
because it was "clear the subcontracting provisions involved were sought
in contemplation of a complete bargaining relationship on behalf of Topaz's employers."' 187 The union had the right to request that Topaz sign an
agreement in its desire to represent its employees. Connell was distinguished because the local in that case had no past relationship with the
employees of Connell and did not seek to establish one, nor did it have
183. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1595.
184. Id at 1596.
185. Id at 1599. This holding was consistent with the General Counsel's position on §

8(f). See NLRB General Counsel Memorandum to all Regional Directors, reprinted in
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) May 2, 1979, at E-1.
186. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1598.
187. Id (emphasis added).
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any intent to represent them.' 8 8 In Shriver-Topaz, the union-employee relationship was sufficiently established by the union's overall intent to seek
recognition by the employer. The NLRB concluded, however, that the
otherwise lawful subcontracting clause would be rendered unlawful as a
result of the inclusion of "self-enforcement" features in the contract.
of selfChairman Fanning dissented, concluding that the mere presence
89
inapplicable.1
proviso
the
make
not
did
provisions
enforcement
The Board considered a variation of the theory that subcontracting
clauses are invalid because an agreement permits enforcement through economic self-help in Operating Engineers, Local 701 (Associated Builders). 19° Woelke & Romero had explained that subcontracting clauses,
which are lawful under the construction industry proviso, can be secured
but not enforced through economic sanctions. 9 In Associated Builders,
the enforcement provision which authorized the union to take economic
action was part of the provisions on grievance and arbitration procedures.' 92 The effect of the clause was to allow the union a means to enforce an arbitration award without litigation. The Board found, however,
that any action by the union to enforce the grievance provision was unlawful "self-help." As the Board explained "The effect of a holding to the
contrary would be to insulate self-help clauses (as applied to secondary
188.

See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers' Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 620 (1975).

189. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1600 n.28. Member Murphy considered the clause to be ambiguous;
therefore, she gave it the benefit of the doubt and construed it to be lawful. Id. at 1599 n.26.

Chairman Fanning relied on his position in Muskegon Bricklayers Union. No. 5 (Greater
Muskegon, General Contractors Assoc.), 152 N.L.R.B. 360, 369-73 (1965) (Fanning, dissenting).
Management may enforce a subcontracting clause by seeking a court order terminating

the contract but it may not read into the contract a provision for automatic contract cancellation in the event of a subcontracting violation. The NLRB has previously ruled that such

actions are an unlawful attempt at "self-enforcement." Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839,
842-46 (1965). Other methods of enforcing subcontracting clauses have been found to be
peaceful and non-coercive and therefore not unlawful. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers, Local 28 (Carrier Corp.), 222 N.L.R.B. 727 (1976). It is important to note that while striking to
enforce the subcontracting clause is unlawful, it is not unlawful to strike to obtain such a
clause. See, e.g., Carpenters, Local 15 (Metro Lathing & Plastering), 240 N.L.R.B. No. 52,
100 L.R.R.M. 1332 (1979).
190. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 99 L.L.R.M. 1589 (1978).
191. The Board stated in Woelke & Romero: "The only limitation on union signatory
clauses was that they could not be enforced by union 'self-help' measures." 99 L.L.R.M. at
1586.
192. Three separate articles of the agreement were involved. Article VIII contained stan-

dard subcontracting language without reference to enforcement. Article IX stated that
"[Elither party may take such action as they deem necessary to enforce the findings and/or
time limits and they shall not be considered in violation of this agreement." 99 L.R.R.M. at
1590. Article X provided for matters to be submitted to arbitration. Id
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91 3
provisions) through the device of the grievance procedure."'
In both Shriver-Topaz and Associated Builders, the Board found the
subcontracting clauses to be violative of section 8(e) because of the mere
presence of self-enforcement provisions.' 94 In his dissenting opinion,
Chairman Fanning specifically rejected this strict doctrine.' 9 In his view,
the mere presence of such self-enforcement clauses does not make the construction industry proviso inapplicable to the contract.1 96 However, all
five Board members, including Chairman Fanning, agreed that the actual
use of economic action to enforce a clause protected by the proviso violates
the Act.
The Board decisions in the above four cases are significant not because
they have altered the law regarding the construction industry proviso, but
because they reaffirm past precedents. ' The Board has, therefore, limited
Connell to the novel factual situation in which it occurred. Subcontracting
clauses, which limit the subcontracting of bargaining unit work to subcontractors having agreements with the union, remain lawful so long as the
union and the contractor have created or intend to create a collective bargaining relationship. The Board refused to read broadly Connell's references to particular job site limitations. It suggested that the Court's job site
language was referring to the possibility that even outside a collective bargaining relationship, a union may enter into a subcontracting agreement if
it is aimed at a Denver Building Trades problem.' 9 8
The rulings by the Board have been denied enforcement, however, by at
least one Circuit Court. Two of the subcontracting cases before the

193. Id at 1593. The Board also stated: "[W]hile the limitations on subcontracting are
technically linked to the contract's grievance-arbitration machinery, article IX nonetheless
reserves to the Union the right to take 'whatever action it deems necssary' for enforcement at
any step of the grievance procedure." 1d at 1592.
194. The Board explained: "The proviso protection is lost where contract terms look to
strikes or other economic pressure for enforcement of secondary agreements." Id. at 1593.
See also Muskegon Bricklayers Union No. 5 (Greater Muskegon General Contractors
Ass'n), 152 N.L.R.B. 360 (1965); Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839 (1965).
195. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1593 (Fanning, dissenting).
196. The rationale for Chairman Fanning's dissent is found in Muskegon Bricklayers
Union No. 5 (Greater Muskegon General Contractors Ass'n), 152 N.L.R.B. 360, 369 (1965)
(Fanning, dissenting).
197. No prior holding of the Board was overruled. The Board merely read Connell as
requiring union signatory subcontracting clauses to be obtained in the context of a collective
bargaining relationship. "Thus, the Court's entire decision is cast in terms of the impact of
the absence of a collective-bargaining relationship upon the applicability of the proviso to a
subcontracting clause which comes within the literal language of the proviso." Carpenters
Local 944 (Woelke & Romero), 239 N.L.R.B. No. 40, 99 L.R.R.M. 1580, 1587-88 (1978).
198. See general,y ACCO Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975)
(the purpose of § 8(e) is to alleviate job site frictions).
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NLRB, Woelke & Romero and Associated Builders, were combined on appeal before the Ninth Circuit.' 9 9 Rejecting the Board's reading of Connell,
a divided panel held that broad union signatory clauses, which restrict
general contractors from subcontracting work to non-union employees, are
not protected by the construction industry proviso to section 8(e). The
court agreed with the General Counsel's earlier position that the proviso
protects subcontracting agreements only when they relate to jobsite friction
between union and non-union employees. 2°° The court stated that the
proviso protects subcontracting restrictions "only when a collective bargaining relationship exists and even then only when an employer or his
subcontractor has employees who are members of the signatory union at
work at some time at the jobsite at which the employer wishes to engage a
non-union subcontractor."' 20 1 Consequently, a general contractor who
does not use unionized employees at a particular jobsite is free under federal law to assign work on that site to non-union subcontractors. Under
the court's rationale, the fact that the contractor may employ members of
the union on other jobsites is irrelevant for purposes of the proviso.
The court construed Connell as leaving open the possibility that the purpose of the construction industry proviso is limited not only to work performed at the jobsite but to the "even narrower" context of alleviating
frictions that may arise when union men work continuously alongside nonunion men on the same construction site.2 °2 It agreed with the Board and
the unions that the proviso was intended to preserve for the construction
industry the state of law as it existed in 1959 when the provision was
passed by Congress. The court explained, however, that the permissible
scope of subcontracting agreements had not been conclusively determined
at that time.20 3 As a result, the court construed the purpose Congress
sought to serve by enacting an exception for the construction industry.2
After a survey of the legislative history, the court concluded that the proviso was only intended to permit unions and construction employers to
199. Associated Builders v. NLRB, 103 L.R.R.M. 2144 (9th Cir. 1980).

200. Id. at 2147. See notes 167-68 and accompanying text supra.
201. Id
202.

Id at 2148. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers' Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 630

(1975).
203. The court did not believe that Carpenters' Union v. Labor Bd., 357 U.S. 93 (1958)
(Sand Door), defined the law applicable to the case before it, because Sand Door did not

involve a subcontractor provision but rather an agreement forbidding the use of non-union
material. 103 L.R.R.M. at 2148. See also IBEW Local 437 (Dimeo Construction Co.), 180
N.L.R.B. 420 (1969); C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 658-62 (1971).
204. 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149. See generally Aaron, The Labor Management Reporting and
DisclosureAct of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1118 (1960); Note, Hot Cargo Clauses.- The
Scope of Section 8(e), 71 YALE L.J. 158, 163 (1961).
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avoid the tension or discontent that exists when members of a union are
required to work on the same job site with non-union workers.
This conclusion extends well beyond the parameters of Connell and it
reads the proviso's legislative history much too broadly. The Connell
Court did not protect Local 100's agreement because of the absence of a
collective bargaining relationship. Connell supplies little support for the
Ninth Circuit's position because it did not address the collective bargaining context. Moreover, an examination of the place of the construction
industry proviso in the overall legislative scheme reveals no intent by Congress to restrict the proviso's purpose or scope. Senator Kennedy's statements show that Congress intended to preserve the status quo with regard
to the construction industry,2" 5 and Board precedent had established the
legality of agreements like those in Associated Builders.2" 6 There was no
indication that Congress desired to limit the proviso in any way other than
its explicit limitation to work to be done at the construction site. Finally,
the Board's theory on section 8(e) has been fairly clear and straightforward
in the context of a valid collective bargaining relationship in which the
union represents a majority of the contractor's employees. The Ninth Circuit's opinion only complicates the law in a manner that was unintended
by Congress.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the NLRB's view that a section 8(f) prehire agreement is a sufficient collective bargaining relationship to support
a subcontracting restriction. 0 7 As mentioned earlier, section 8(f) permits
construction industry employers and unions to enter into collective bargaining agreements before the hiring of any employees. 20 8 The Ninth Circuit concluded that a union signatory subcontractor clause in this "prehire" context forces non-union firms and employees to submit to union
representation in order to obtain subcontracting opportunities.2 0 9 The
205. See note 86 and accompanying text supra.
206. Prior to 1959, subcontracting agreements, including union signatory agreements,
were common in the construction industry and were lawful. Operating Eng'rs, Local 3 v.
NLRB, 266 F.2d 905, 909-10 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 834 (1959); Northern Cal.
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America, 119 N.L.R.B. 1026, 1029 (1959). Between
1959 and 1975, the Board and the courts continued to hold that subcontracting agreements,
such as those in Woelke & Romero, were lawful under the proviso. See, e.g., Laborers
Local 383 v. NLRB, 323 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1963). Moreover, in Sand Door, the very decision that the proviso was designed to preserve, the Supreme Court endorsed an agreement
not to subcontract work to a nonunion subcontractor. Such agreements have been traditionally understood to mean that the employer can subcontract only to employers signatory with

the agreement. See Carpenters Union v. Labor Bd., 357 U.S. 93 (1958) (Sand Door).
207. 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149-50.
208. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
209. 103 L.R.R.M. at 2149-50. The Court's holding is difficult to reconcile with the rea-
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court found that such an arrangement could have a coercive effect and
violate the right of employees to refrain from union activities.210 It also
considered such an arrangement as an instrument for "top-down" organizing which the Court condemned in Connell.
In summary, under the Ninth Circuit's view of the law, subcontracting
clauses which require subcontractors to be union signatories with an appropriate union are lawful if entered into between an employer and union
having a collective bargaining relationship. Such a collective bargaining
relationship is not established, however, by a section 8(f) pre-hire agreement. Further, any clause will lose its immunity unless it is restricted to
situations in which non-union and union employees are present on the
same construction site. Clauses which permit economic self-enforcement,
however, will cause an agreement otherwise protected to fall outside pro,viso protections.
This theory will probably be hotly contested in Shriver-Topaz on appeal
in the District of Columbia Circuit."' Both the Ninth Circuit and the
Connell Court cited the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Drivers
Local 695 v. NLRB 21 2 to support their position. In that decision, the court
stated that the construction proviso was viewed by Congress as an effort to
alleviate frictions that may arise at a jobsite between union and non-union
workmen. 213 The Court did not commit itself, however, to the view that
this was the only narrow purpose of the proviso.
The Connell Court did address the signatory subcontracting clause issue
in a limited fashion. It explained that section 8(e)'s authorization "extends
only to agreements in the context of collective bargaining relationship and,
in light of congressional references to the Denver Building Trades problem,
possibly to common-situs relationship in particular jobsites as well." 2 14 A
sons why Congress enacted § 8(f). See note 197 supra. Pre-hire agreements are not binding
upon the employer unless and until the union can show that it does represent a majority of
his employees. NLRB v. Local 103, Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335 (1978). Nevertheless, an
employer may legally abide by such an agreement unless an election petition is filed and the
union loses the election.
210. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
211. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Shriver-Topaz), 239 N.L.R.B. No. 42,
99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978), petition to review and cross-applicationfor enforcementfled, Nos.
78-2177, 78-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
212. 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
213. Id. at 553.
214. 421 U.S. at 633. Connell did not decide whether a union without a collective bargaining relationship with a general contractor could use a subcontracting clause for a particular jobsite. By leaving open whether such a limited agreement would be valid, the Court
implied that there may be other situations in which a subcontracting clause outside a collective bargaining relationship is lawful. See id at 635.
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reference by the Court that union signatory subcontracting clauses could
"possibly" be for the limited purpose ofjobsite friction should not be read
as a rejection of such clauses if they are not so limited and yet remain in
the context of a collective bargaining agreement. Rather, the Court's statement suggests that clauses within a collective bargaining relationship are
generally protected and that those outside such relationships are protected
when they refer to jobsite friction. Further, the Connell Court concluded
that Congress in its attempt to limit top-down organizing could not have
intended to protect only those subcontracting agreements with an organizationl purpose. The Court emphasized both a lack of collective bargaining relationship and attempt to obtain one.2" 5 Its decision should,
therefore, be read as interpreting the proviso to protect all subcontracting
agreements governing job site work which are reached or sought in the
context of a collective bargaining relationship.2" 6
The Board's position in the above four cases recognizes the realities of
the construction industry.2" 7 Limitations on subcontracting to particular
job sites would be virtually impossible to negotiate and administer on the
local union level. More importantly, the Board's decision is consistent
with Congressional intent to preserve the pattern of collective bargaining
in the construction industry. In enacting the construction industry proviso,
Congress ratified the continued legality of such clauses. There is no indication in the legislative history that Congress considered imposing numer215. 421 U.S. at 631 n.10.
216.

See Bullard Contracting Corp. v. Laborers Local 91, 100 L.R.R.M. 2959 (W.D.N.Y.

1979); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. Maloney, 98 L.R.R.M. 3193 (C.D. Cal. 1978);
Signatory Negotiating Comm. v. Operating Eng'rs Local 9, 447 F. Supp. 1384 (D. Colo.
1978); Swanson-Dean Corp. v. Seattle Dist. Council of Carpenters, Nos. C76-707M, C77298M (W.D. Wash. Oct. 7, 1977). But see Operating Eng'rs v. Neilsen Co., 92 L.R.R.M.
2861 (D.C. Idaho 1975); Long v. Floorcraft Carpet Co., 95 L.R.R.M. 3143 (D.C. Ore. 1977);
Long v. Pam's Carpet Serv., Inc., 95 L.R.R.M. 3145 (D.C. Ore. 1977). See also California
Dump Truck Owners Ass'n v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 562 F.2d 607, 613-614 (9th Cir.

1977), in which the court stated that "the objectionable effect [in Connel] arose from a
separate, non-collective bargaining agreement. The difference is significant" and the contract clause at issue is exempt.
217. Because of the NLRB's decisions the General Counsel issued a revision of his earlier guidelines for handling cases under the construction industry proviso. He stated that:
It seems clear that secondary agreements between qualified parties in the construction industry are protected by the proviso if:

I. There is a valid collective bargaining relationship between the parties, either
under section 9 or under the provisions of section 8(f).
2. The clause pertains to work to be done at the site of construction.
3. The contract does not give the signatory union the right to "self-help" to
enforce the secondary provisions.
NLRB General Counsel Memorandum 79-1 (Jan. 9, 1979), reprintedin DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA), Jan. 10, 1979.
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ous additional restrictions on subcontracting clauses. The clarity with
which the Board has handled the scope of the construction industry proviso to section 8(e) in the light of Connell is further evidence of the inapplicability of the decision to either the proviso or to antitrust issues in the
context of a collective bargaining relationship.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The inadequacies of Connell are highlighted by the conflicting interpretations of the labor exemption and the construction industry proviso since
the decision. The Court has failed to supply a clear theory for determining
liability under both laws.
The applicability of the labor exemption is especially confusing when a
complaint alleges no conspiracy to lessen business competition. As a result, the lower courts have applied their own notions of economic policy to
labor-antitrust cases. Some courts have ignored the vital labor policy that
unions may eliminate competition over wages, hours, and working conditions. A successful union strives to diminish or eliminate competition
among employers concerning wages and working conditions, thus requiring competition in other areas of efficiency. These legitimate union goals
conflict with an antitrust policy favoring competition in all aspects of the
economy. To protect unions from such a broad theory of antitrust, the
labor exemption should be clearly defined with ample room for appropriate union activity.
Little economic data has been submitted to the courts in the recent construction cases. For example, the Connell Court assumed that competition
among subcontractors may be the result of factors other than paying workers less but the record was devoid of any empirical data.2"' The resolution
of the legal issues should be made in light of the economic realities. Without empirical examination of the effect of union activities on competition,
an accurate analysis by the court becomes increasingly elusive.
Given the complexity and the significance of these issues, the Supreme
Court will again confront the scope of labor's antitrust exemption. It
should be reminded that Connell is only one in a long line of labor-anti218. 421 U.S. at 623. The Court also stated that "[c]urtailment of competition based on
an efficiency is neither a goal of federal labor policy nor a necessary effect of the elimination
of competition among workers. Moreover, competition based on efficiency is a positive
value that the antitrust laws strive to protect." Id The Court's statements are obvious, but
their applicability is questionable with the submission of empirical evidence. Similarly, in
Muko the contractor had contended, but had not proved, that the cost of construction increased for Silver's by $20,000 for each franchise outlet constructed. He also argued that he
achieved his competitive edge without paying substandard wages. Muko v. Building Trades
Council, 609 F.2d 1368, 1371 (3d Cir. 1979).
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trust cases. 2 19 Connell's significance can be found in its analysis of both
the labor exemption and the construction industry proviso in the absence
of a collective bargaining relationship. In assessing new antitrust liabilities, the intricacies of the federal labor law are relevant because they manifest Congressional intent. With regard to the construction industry,
practices nonexempt under antitrust may be authorized under the labor
law. The more specific labor policy should prevail over the generalized
restrictions of antitrust.
In terms of the construction industry proviso, the NLRB has found that
Connell does not compel a more narrow interpretation than has been used
in the past. Despite the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the Board's position is consistent with the legislative history. There is no indication that Congress
had considered imposing numerous restraints on union subcontracting
clauses. Thus, if the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion reflects the
more accurate Board view, conflicting with the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court may clarify the law on this issue. Hopefully the Board's position
will prevail.
The impact of the antitrust laws and section 8(e) on collective bargaining will probably be a source of continuing controversy, because the
Supreme Court has not been able to articulate a rationale for determining
the bounds of the antitrust proscription in the context of labor cases. Because of the undeveloped state of the law in this area, lower courts may be
tempted to hold that an antitrust violation follows automatically whenever
the challenged labor conduct is held to be nonexempt or a violation of
section 8(e). Such a result would be a disastrous intrusion of antitrust law
into labor activity. As was explained earlier, the labor movement is antithetical to antitrust policy in its avowed purpose to eliminate competition
over wages among workers doing the same job in the same trade. The
labor laws themselves stand as a constant reminder of congressional policy
favoring a system of collective bargaining in this area.
219. Even though Connell should not be read as broadly as first suspected, the uncertainty of the law in this area has opened the doors wider than ever before for federal antitrust suits involving organized labor. See generally Callan, Should Secondary Boycotts be
Includedin the Labor Antitrust Exemption?-A Professor'sView, 47 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
1331 (1979); Sheinkman, Secondary Boycotts and the LaborAntitrust Exemption - A Labor
Union's View, 47 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 1315 (1979). In a parallel development in the

wake of Connell's obscure opinion, the Federal Trade Commission has cited a labor organization for a subcontracting violation which the Commission claimed inflated construction

costs. The FTC's charges against the union have resulted in a consent order agreement
which prohibits the union from making subcontracting clauses. This FTC order is the first
successful enforcement action by the FTC against a union. See 43 Fed. Reg. (July 19, 1978).
See also DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 18, 1978, at A-I.
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841

With the failure of labor legislation in the recent past, it is not likely that
Congress will resolve the policy questions inherent in applying labor's
nonstatutory exemption. The federal courts, however, should avoid judicial legislation. They should also give deference to the rulings of the
NLRB as the agency mandated by Congress to interpret national labor
policy. The issues outlined in this comment may have to be settled ultimately by the Supreme Court. In so deciding, the Court should bear in
mind that Congress has twice been forced to quell the zealousness of the
courts in applying the strictures of antitrust to labor.
Robert W Smith

